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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Sun Surety appeals from the order denying its motion for order 
to set aside default judgment and to exonerate bond. The order was denied in the 
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, the Honorable William W. 
Barrett, presiding. This Court has appellate jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3 (2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL & STANDARD OF APPELLATE 
REVIEW 
1. Whether the statutory notice required by the UCA § 77-20b-101(l) and (3) 
is satisfied when notice is served on the surety's agent when both the 
address of the surety and the bail bondsman are listed on the bond. The 
court's conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. See State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932,935-40 (Utah 1994); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1265-
71 (Utah 1993). 
2. Whether the trial court's denial of Sun Surety's "Motion for Order to Set 
Aside Default Judgment and to Exonerate Bond" was a proper exercise of 
its jurisdiction. The standard of review is abuse of discretion. Gilmor v. 
Wright, 850 P.2d 431,434 (Utah 2001). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 77-20b-101 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 77-20b-104 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-35-102 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant Sun Surety posted a bond to secure the appearance in court of 
defendant Defino Cadena. Mr. Cadena failed to appear in court. Notice of 
nonappearance was sent to the address of Sun Surety's agent, Scott D. Candland. 
After the six-month statutory period, the court ruled that the bond was forfeited. 
Sun Surety moved to set aside the default judgment and exonerate the bond, 
arguing that the notice of nonappearance was invalid because it was sent to the 
agent and not the surety itself. The trial court denied this motion. The trial court 
found that "service on the agent is effective as service on the surety itself." R. 68-
69. Sun Surety appeals this judgment. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On January 11, 2000, Sun Surety issued a bond for defendant Defino 
Cadena. Sun Surety's local agent, Scott D. Candland, executed the bond for the 
amount of $6,064.00. R. 10. On January 16, 2001, Mr. Cadena failed to appear at 
his arraignment. The court commenced the bond forfeiture proceeding and issued 
a warrant for his arrest. R. 14-16. On January 17, 2001, the court clerk sent notice 
of Cadena's nonappearance to Mr. Candland's place of business, Bail Out Fast. R. 
17. Sun Surety and Mr. Candland failed to produce Mr. Cadena within the six 
month time period. On July 26, 2001, the District Attorney's Office filed a motion 
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for Judgment of Forfeiture on the bond. R. 21-22. Judge Quinn signed this 
motion. On July 27, 2001, judgment was entered.1 R. 23-24. 
On September 4, 2001, Appellant Sun Surety filed a motion to set aside the 
default judgment and to exonerate the bond. R. 44-63. On October 1, 2001, a 
hearing was held to hear Sun Surety's motion.2 R. 79. On October 9, 2001, Judge 
William R. Barrett found that "service on the agent is effective as service on the 
surety itself and signed the Order denying Sun Surety's Motion to set aside the 
Default Judgment. R. 68-69. 
On October 23, 2001, the Appellant Sun Surety filed an objection to 
findings of fact and a motion to amend order claiming that the court did not enter 
findings on the record. R.72-73. On November 8, 2001, the Appellant filed Notice 
of Appeal. R. 74. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Utah Code does not require that notice of nonappearance be sent to the 
surety company itself to the exclusion of an agent. The bail forfeiture statute does 
not alter the fundamental principles of agency law. Therefore, the forfeiture 
statute allows service of notification on a principal's appointed agent. 
1
 Cf, the Court of Appeals Index and the Record. The Record indicates that both 
the motion and the judgment were filed in July 2001, not January 26, 2001, as the 
Index indicates. 
2
 Cf, the Court of Appeals Index and the Record. Both the Index and a portion of 
the Record erroneously indicate that the hearing was held on May 17, 2001. The 
hearing actually occurred on October 1, 2001, after the forfeiture judgment had 
been entered. (See beginning of hearing transcript). 
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Basic agency law requires that the acts of the agent be considered the acts 
of the principal. Mr. Candland had statutory, apparent, or implied authority to 
receive notice on Sun Surety's behalf. Furthermore, the power of attorney did not 
limit Mr. Candland's authority to receive notification. Thus, the notice that the 
State sent to Mr. Candland is imputed to Sun Surety regardless of whether the 
notice was actually delivered to Sun Surety. 
The trial court acted properly by denying defendant's motion to set aside 
the default judgment and did not err in its factual findings. Finally, Sun Surety 
was not deprived of due process because the notice was properly sent to its agent. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE UTAH CODE DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT NOTICE TO 
BE SENT TO THE SURETY COMPANY ITSELF TO THE 
EXCLUSION OF AN AGENT. 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-20b-101 does not require that notification be 
sent to the surety company itself to the exclusion of an appointed agent. The 
statute states "If a defendant who has posted bail fails to appear before the 
appropriate court.. .the clerk of the court shall: (a) mail notice of nonappearance 
by certified mail, return receipt requested, within 30 days to the address of the 
surety who posted the bond." 
In order to preclude the application of traditional agency law, a bail 
forfeiture statute must explicitly require that notification is only valid if sent to the 
surety company itself. Absent that requirement, the statute allows for the normal 
principal/agent relationship between a surety and a bail bondsman. State v. 
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Parada, 75 Wash.App. 224, 877 P.2d 231 (Wash. App. 1994); State v. Cole, 618 
So.2d 4 (La. App.3d 1993). 
In Parada, the Washington Court of Appeals considered "whether the 
State's notice to Cascade [agent] of Parada's [defendant] unexplained 
absence.. .satisfied the statutory notice requirement to National, a surety, under 
RCW 10.19.090."3 Parada, 877 P.2d at p. 235. The court determined that "[a] 
rational and sensible construction of RCW 10.19.090 does not preclude a surety 
from designating an agent to receive notice on its behalf under the well-established 
laws of agency. The statute clearly does not purport to alter fundamental agency 
principles." Ibid. 
In Cole, a Louisiana appeals court ruled, "we find no error in the trial 
court's determination that service of the appearance date on Amwest Surety's 
agent fulfilled the requirements antecedent to the entry of judgment of bond 
forfeiture." Cole, 618 So.2d at p.5. 
The same rationale applies to Utah's forfeiture statute. There is no 
indication in the code that the meaning of the word "surety" should be restricted to 
the surety company alone. The Utah Legislature declined to use the statutorily 
defined term "bail bond surety" to designate that specific entity as the sole valid 
recipient of forfeiture notification. See U.C.A. § 31A-35-102, providing 
3
 The pertinent part of RCW 10.19.090 provides "[i]f the surety is not notified by 
the court in writing of the unexplained failure of the defendant to appear within 
thirty days of the date for appearance, then the forfeiture shall be null and void and 
the recognizance exonerated" (emphasis added). 
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definitions of "bail bond agent/' "bail bond surety," and "bail bond surety 
company." Instead, the Legislature employed the broad term "surety" indicating 
that forfeiture notification to the company or the agent meets the statutory 
obligation. 
Furthermore, the Utah forfeiture statute contains no language that can be 
interpreted as precluding a surety's ability to designate an agent to receive notice 
in its behalf. The statute clearly does not claim to alter fundamental agency 
principles. Without this explicit requirement, the statute allows sureties to appoint 
agents to receive notice on their behalf. 
Appellant asserts that the State's notification does not meet the statutory 
requirement because it was not sent "to the address of the surety who posted the 
bond." U.C.A. § 77-20b-101(l)(a). This argument fails because the Cadena bond 
lists both the address of Mr. Candland's business (i.e. Bail Out Fast) and Sun 
Surety. Furthermore, the text of the bond indicates that Sun Surety desired that 
correspondence should be sent to Mr. Candland. Mr. Candland's business address 
is listed prominently at the top of the bond in bold while Sun Surety's address is 
listed in the body of the text. Also, immediately below Sun Surety's address is a 
reference to Mr. Candland as its agent. R. 10. Because the bond lists both 
addresses and because the Sun Surety address refers to Mr. Candland as its agent, 
the State met the statutory obligation by sending the notice to Mr. Candland's 
address. 
Appellant mistakenly relies on Florida case law. In Allied Fidelity, a 
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Florida Court of Appeals ruled that the Florida bail forfeiture statute requires 
"express actual notice" to the surety instead of "implied actual notice" supplied 
through "daily court calendars available to bondsmen in the...[c]ourthouse." 
Allied Fidelity Ins. Co. v. State, 499 So.2d 932, 933 (Fla.App.lst 1986). The 
court ruled that "a surety must be provided with direct information of a 
defendant's appearance date." Ibid at p.934. The court did not consider nor make 
any holding on whether notice could be sent to the surety's agent. Here, the State 
maintains that "express actual notice" of Cadena's nonappearance was supplied to 
Sun Surety through its agent Mr. Candland. 
The Utah bail forfeiture statute does not claim to alter the fundamental 
agency principles. Nothing in the statute states that the notification of 
nonappearance must be sent to the surety company itself to the exclusion of an 
agent. Absent a statutory mandate, there is no reason to give the word "surety" a 
restrictive meaning, and thus hold that the Utah Code Annotated § 77-20b-101 
abandoned common law agency principles. 
II. MR. CANDLAND HAD AUTHORITY FROM SUN SURETY 
TO RECEIVE NOTICE ON ITS BEHALF. 
Mr. Candland was Sun Surety's agent for all matters concerning the Cadena 
bond. As a result of this relationship, Mr. Candland possessed either (A) statutory 
authority, (B) apparent authority, or (C) express implied authority to receive the 
forfeiture notice on Sun Surety's behalf. Furthermore, (D) the power of attorney 
did not limit Mr. Candland's authority to receive notification. 
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A. Statutory Authority 
As the bail bond agent, Utah Code requires that the acts of Mr. Candland be 
deemed the acts of Sun Surety for all matters related to the execution of bail bond: 
"The acts or conduct of any bail bond agent.. .who acts within the scope of the 
authority delegated to him by the bail bond surety, are considered to be the acts or 
conduct of the bail bond surety for which the bail bond agent.. .is acting as agent." 
U.C.A. § 31A-35-601(2). Moreover, the statute defines the agent as the "bail bond 
surety company" itself: "'Bail bond surety company' means any sole proprietor or 
entity who: (a)(i) is the agent of a surety insurer that issues a bail bond in 
connection with judicial proceedings..." U.C.A. § 31A-35-102(4). 
These provisions require that the acts and conduct of Mr. Candland be 
considered the acts and conduct of Sun Surety. Mr. Candland's conduct relating 
to the execution of the bond includes receiving the notice of Cadena's 
nonappearance. The statute mandates that this conduct be considered the conduct 
of Sun Surety. 
B. Apparent Authority 
Beyond the statutory requirements, Mr. Candland also possessed apparent 
authority to receive the forfeiture notification on Sun Surety's behalf. 
Agency law requires that the principal be bound by the acts of its agents 
when acting pursuant to the authority that the principal apparently gave. This 
governing principle was quoted in Horrocks v. Westfalia Systemat, 892 P.2d 14, 
15-16 (Utah App. 1995): 
l l 
In Harrison v. Auto Securities Co, 70 Utah 11, 257 P. 677 (1927) the Utah 
Supreme Court stated "It is a general principle of the law of agency, 
running through all contracts made by agents with third parties, that the 
principals are bound by the acts of their agents which fall within the 
apparent scope of the authority of the agents, and that the principals will not 
be permitted to deny the authority of their agents against innocent third 
parties, who have dealt with those agents in good faith." 
Here, the power of attorney manifested to the State that Mr. Candland 
possessed all the authority necessary to execute the bond. The power of attorney 
states "Sun Surety Insurance Company...does make, constitute and appoint the 
named agent its true and lawful Attorney-in-fact with full power and authority to 
sign the Company and affix its seal to, and deliver on its behalf as surety, a bail 
bond only." R.13. This representation clearly demonstrated to the State that Mr. 
Candland had power to act on Sun Surety's behalf. Therefore, Sun Surety should 
be bound by the acts of Mr. Candland. 
C. Express Implied Authority 
Alternatively, Mr. Candland possessed implied authority from Sun Surety 
to accept notification on its behalf. 
The Utah Supreme Court has instructed that "[i]mplied authority is actual 
authority based upon the premise that whenever the performance of certain 
business is confided to an agent, such authority carries with it by implication 
authority to do collateral acts which are the natural and ordinary incidents of the 
main act or business authorized." Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 
762 P.2d 1090,1094-95 (Utah 1988). 
Here, with the power of attorney, Sun Surety impliedly authorized Mr. 
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Candland to receive the forfeiture notice. The power of attorney gave Mr. 
Candland full power and authority to execute the bailbond. Receipt of the 
forfeiture notice is a collateral act that is a "natural and ordinary [incident] of the 
main act or business" of bail bondsmen. Ibid. Thus, Sun Surety should be bound 
by the acts of Mr. Candland. 
D. The Power of Attorney does not limit Mr. Candland's authority to 
receive notification. 
Agency law does not sustain an undisclosed limitation between Sun Surety 
and Mr. Candland regarding Mr. Candland's ability to receive notification of 
nonappearance. 
For reasons of equity, undisclosed limitations between a principle and an 
agent are not recognized when harm would result to an innocent third party. 
Specifically, a limitation on bail bondsman's ability to receive notification is not 
recognized when the State reasonably relies on the authority the power of attorney 
grants. Horrocks v. Westfalia Systemat, 892 P.2d 14, 16 (Utah App. 1995); State 
v. Parada, 75 Wash.App. 224, 232, 877 P.2d 231, 236 (Wash. App. 1994). 
In Horrocks, the Utah Court of Appeals listed many factors when 
determining that an agent had apparent authority to act for the principal. But, the 
court indicated one factor that it considered to be most important: "[p]erhaps most 
importantly, Westfalia [principal] failed to give Horrocks [third party] notice of 
any limitations on Buchanan's [agent] authority." Horrocks, 892 P.2d at p. 16. 
Additionally, the court quoted a principle of equity that governs in these 
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situations: "'Where a loss is to be suffered through the misconduct of an agent, it 
should be borne by those who put it in his power to do the wrong.'" Ibid, (quoting 
County of Macon v. Shores, 97 U.S. 272, 279, 24 L.Ed. 889, 890 (1877)). 
The Washington Court of Appeals held that when a power of attorney is 
silent regarding notification, it is reasonable for the State assume that the agent has 
authority to receive the notification: 
However, the power of attorney is this case is silent about whether Cascade 
had authority to receive notice on National's behalf. Given the sort of 
authority that power of attorney does expressly convey, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that receiving notice for National on matters 
involving Parada's bond was part of Cascade's function in carrying out its 
obligations under the power of attorney. 
Parada, 877 P.2d at p.236. 
In this case, Sun Surety did nothing to indicate to the State that Mr. 
Candland could not receive notification of nonappearance. The power of attorney 
fails to limit Mr. Candland's authority in this respect. While the power of attorney 
is limited in several ways with regards to Mr. Cadena (e.g. guarantee of future 
lawful conduct, adherence to travel limitations, fees, etc.), the document is silent 
as to any limitation on the Mr. Candland's power. Considering the large, explicit 
grant of authority that the power of attorney gives Mr. Candland, the State 
justifiably relied on that representation of authority. Furthermore, equity demands 
that the State not be punished for undisclosed limitations between Sun Surety and 
Mr. Candland. Equity requires that Sun Surety bear the loss because it placed Mr. 
Candland in the position to commit this wrong. 
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E. The notice sent to Mr. Candland imputes to Sun Surety. 
Based on Mr. Candland's authority, the notification the State sent to Mr. 
Candland imputes to Sun Surety. When the agent is aware of information within 
his scope of employment, agency law requires that the information impute to the 
principal: "An agent's knowledge of matter within the scope of his or her authority 
is imputed to his or her principal for it is presumed that such knowledge will be 
disclosed to the principal." Macris v. Sculptured Software, Inc., 24 P.3d 984, 990 
(Utah 2001). 
It is undisputed that Mr. Candland was notified of Mr. Cadena's 
nonappearance. The return receipt of the letter containing the notification 
indicates his acceptance of the letter on January 18, 2000. Receiving the 
notification fell within the scope of Mr. Candland's authority to execute the 
Cadena bond. Because Sun Surety's agent Mr. Candland received the notification 
of nonappearance, this information is imputed to Sun Surety regardless of whether 
Mr. Candland actually disclosed the information to Sun Surety. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by (A) refusing to grant 
defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment or (B) issuing the October 9th 
Order. 
A, The Trial Court properly denied Sun Surety's "Motion to Set Aside 
Default Judgment'' based on U.C.A. § 77-20b-104. 
Judge Barrett's order denying Sun Surety's "Motion to Set Aside Default 
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Judgment" should be upheld because it was not an abuse of discretion. The Order 
complied with all of the requirements of the bail forfeiture statute. U.C.A. § 77-
20b-104. 
The statute requires a court to enter bail forfeiture if all of its requirements 
are satisfied. Utah Code Annotated § 77-20b-104 provides: 
(2) A court shall enter judgment of bail forfeiture without further notice if it 
finds by a preponderance of the evidence: (a) the defendant failed to appear 
as required; (b) the surety was given notice of the defendant's 
nonappearance in accordance with Section 77-20b-101; (c) the surety failed 
to bring the defendant to the court within the six-month period under 
Section 77-20b-102; and (d) the prosecutor has complied with the notice 
requirements under Subsection (1). 
In this case, on July 26, 2001, Judge Quinn found that all of the 
requirements of § 77-20b-104 were satisfied and entered judgment. R.23-24. The 
only dispute Sun Surety raised was whether the surety had been given notice in 
accordance with subsection (b). After the hearing, Judge Barrett determined that 
"service on the agent is effective as service on the surety itself," therefore 
satisfying the requirement of § 77-20b-104(b). R. 68-69. As discussed above, this 
holding should be affirmed. Sun Surety has not asserted any additional violation 
under § 77-20b-104 as to why Judge Barrett's ruling was an abuse of discretion. 
Sun Surety asserts that both statutory and case law pertaining to default 
judgment requires that the forfeiture judgment be set aside. However, Judge 
Quinn ruled a "Judgment of Forfeiture" and at no time has a default judgment 
been entered on this case. R. 23-24. The forfeiture statute does not mirror the rule 
on default judgments. Compare U.C.A. § 77-20b-104 and Rule 55 U.R.C.P. Utah 
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Code Annotated § 77-20b-104 provides its own criteria for determination of 
forfeitures, independent of the law pertaining to default judgments. Sun Surety 
has not made any assertions based on the bail forfeiture statute as to why Judge 
Barrett's order is an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, there is no basis for this 
Court to find that there has been an abuse of discretion. 
B. The Trial Court did not err in its findings of facts. 
Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by not issuing 
findings of fact. The State maintains that the trial court's Order provides an 
adequate finding of fact. The Order accurately reflects the findings made during 
in the oral hearing. R. 79. 
Even if the Order were deemed inadequate, Appellant's claim is deficient 
because the lack of factual finding is a harmless error. The Utah Court of Appeals 
has stated that "a trial court's decision may be 'affirmed if the failure to make the 
missing findings can be viewed as harmless error.'" Colonial Pacific Leasing 
Corp. v. J.W.CJ.R. Corp., 997 P.2d 541, 546 (Utah App. 1999) (quoting Hall v. 
Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1025 (Utah App. 1993)). Here, the facts are largely 
uncontroverted. Both State and Appellant in essence agree to the facts. Because 
there is no dispute as to the facts, the lack of factual findings is a harmless error. 
IV. DUE PROCESS IS NOT VIOLATED BY SENDING NOTICE TO AN 
AGENT INSTEAD OF THE PRINCIPAL. 
Because the notice imputes to Sun Surety, the Appellant's due process 
argument is without merit. Appellant asserts that due process was denied because 
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no notice was given to Appellant. However, lack of communication between a 
principal and its agent does not constitute a violation of due process. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should affirm the trial court's determination that service on the 
agent is effective as service on the surety itself. Nothing in the Utah Code 
mandates that notice of bond forfeiture must be sent to the surety company itself to 
the exclusion of an appointed agent. Nothing in the code claims to alter the 
fundamental concepts of agency law. Because Mr. Candland had authority to act 
on Sun Surety's behalf, the notice received by Mr. Candland imputes to Sun 
Surety. The State should not suffer a loss because of Sun Surety's delinquent 
agent. 
The trial court properly ruled in dismissing Sun Surety's "Motion to Set 
Aside Default Judgment" and did not abuse its discretion according to the criteria 
for bail forfeiture. Also, the findings of fact were sufficient. Finally, failure of an 
agent to pass on information to the principal does not amount to a denial of due 
process. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED th i s /7_ day of July, 2002. *£ 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney, 
urina A. Higgins 
Deputy District Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellee was delivered to David M. Cook, Attorney for the Appellant, Sun Surety 
Insurance Co., at 211 East 300 South #216, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the 
/V_dayof July, 2002. 
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